Memorandum Analyzing the Pending Ordinances Creating an Office of Police Ombudsman and the Collective Bargaining Rights of Spokane Police Officers.

The Police Guild has correctly pointed out that any changes in their daily working conditions must first go through the collective bargaining process. If the City and the Guild can't reach agreement on the changes, an arbitrator must then decide whether or not the proposed change will be made. The City is not authorized to unilaterally make changes to daily working conditions without engaging in the bargaining process. Doing so would create an unfair labor practice in violation of RCW 41.56.140:

> **It shall be an unfair labor practice for a public employer:**
>
> (1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce public employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by this chapter
> (2) To control, dominate or interfere with a bargaining representative;
> (3) To discriminate against a public employee who has filed an unfair labor practice charge;
> (4) **To refuse to engage in collective bargaining.**

RCW 41.56.140 (2008 emphasis added).

Washington's Public Employment Relations Commission ("The PERC") has the initial legal authority to determine whether an employer has violated the rule against making changes in daily working conditions without engaging in collective bargaining. The PERC has established the following test:

> A complaint alleging a "unilateral change" must establish both: (1) the existence of a relevant status quo; and (2) a meaningful change in employee wages, hours, or working conditions. An employer only commits an unfair labor practice under RCW 41.56.140(4) if it imposes a new term or condition of employment, or meaningfully changes an existing term or condition of employment, without exhausting its bargaining obligations.

City of Kalama, Decision 6773-A (PECB, 2000). The question then becomes whether any provisions in the proposed police ombudsman ordinance that were not bargained for by the union meaningfully change working conditions for Spokane officers.

The PERC has ruled that police oversight ordinances that can lead to discipline of an individual officer beyond the procedures agreed upon in the collective bargaining agreement or the release of privileged information about an officer do meaningfully change the working conditions of employees and must be bargained for prior to being enacted. City of Seattle, Decision 9957 (PECB, 2008) and City of Spokane, Decision 5054, 5055 (PECB, 1995).[1] In both cases, the PERC found that citizen review panels

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1 See full opinions at Exhibit 2.

enacted by ordinance had the power to influence the discipline of officers and release privileged information to the public, thus requiring collective bargaining on how discipline could be influenced and information released. There does not appear to be any reported Washington legal decision that would require a City to engage in collective bargaining on the activities of a police ombudsman that do not influence the disciplinary process or result in the release of privileged information.

The City of Spokane City Council is currently considering an ordinance to create an Office of Police Ombudsman ("OPO"), staffed by an independent law enforcement professional to replace the existing Citizen's Review Panel. The Mayor's Office and the Police Guild have already reached agreement on changes to the collective bargaining agreement that would allow an OPO to observe disciplinary investigation interviews and review files. The first draft of the proposed ordinance proposed by the Mayor's office incorporates the terms of the agreement between the City and the Guild (portions shaded gray in the ordinance) and then goes on to partially address additional duties outside the realms of discipline and release of privileged information, which are not subject to collective bargaining. The first draft of the ordinance leaves some important gaps that are not addressed by the collective bargaining agreement in regards to the OPO's duties outside the realm of discipline.

The gaps in the current draft ordinance require updated language that does not conflict with the amended collective bargaining agreement. The updated draft adds the clarifying language necessary to ensure that the OPO fulfills its purpose of enacting best law enforcement practices without interfering with the collective bargaining rights of individual officers. This updated language incorporates the exact language in the amendment to the collective bargaining agreement[2] and does not meaningfully change the procedures regarding either the disciplinary process or the release of privileged information. In fact, the additional language better clarifies that the neither the OPO nor the information it gathers can be used to influence the discipline of an officer. There is also nothing in the ordinance that would violate an officer's *Garrity*[3] rights because the OPO sits in on any officer disciplinary interviews with the Internal Affairs Department rather than conducting a separate interview with the officer subject to potential discipline.

The clarifying language in the updated draft confirms that the law enforcement professionals staffing the OPO may provide their analysis of what is working and not working in regards to police policy and training as exhibited in specific incidents. This professional analysis could not be used in the discipline of an officer. It could be used to prevent future negative outcomes and the deterioration of the relationship between law enforcement employees and their employers, the citizens of Spokane. These are the essential purposes of the proposed OPO and will be successful because this clarified OPO model would focus on informed solutions rather than finger-pointing at individuals.

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2 See a copy of the amendments to collective bargaining agreement at Exhibit 1.
3 In *Garrity v. New Jersey*, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), the Supreme Court held that, where police officers being investigated were given the choice either to incriminate themselves or to forfeit their jobs, involuntary confessions coerced from officers who refused to testify on grounds of self-incrimination could not be used in subsequent criminal prosecutions.

Exhibit 1- Original Agreement between Police Guild and Mayor's Office

OFFICE OF POLICE OMBUDSMAN

Tentative Agreement between the City and the Police Guild April 8,2008.
The Office of Police Ombudsman (OPO) will provide a professional presence to help ensure a quality investigation in real time, and visible, independent oversight to reassure the public.

(a) The OPO will actively monitor all police department internal investigations.

(b) The OPO may receive complaints from any complaining party, including, without limitation citizens or employees of the police department. The OPO will forward all complaints to IA within three business days for processing and, when appropriate, investigation. The OPO will not conduct independent disciplinary investigations, but may participate in interviews as provided herein.

(c) In addition to complaints received by the OPO, Internal Affairs will provide copies of all other complaints to the OPO within three business days. Once the case is closed, the OP0 will return all case file materials to IA for retention, but will have subsequent access to closed cases.

(d) The OPO will have the opportunity to make a recommendation for mediation to the Chief of Police, prior to investigation. In the event the Department, the complainant and the officer all agree to mediation, that process will be utilized rather than sending the matter on for investigation. Assuming the officer participates in good faith during the mediation process, the officer will not be subject to discipline and no disciplinary finding will be entered against the officer. Good faith means that the officer listens and considers the issues raised by the complainant, and acts and responds appropriately. Agreement with either the complainant or the mediator is not a requirement of good faith. In the event an agreement to mediate is reached and the complainant thereafter refuses to participate, the officer will be considered to have participated in good faith.

(e) Once any complaint is received by the Internal Affairs unit, it shall be submitted to the chain of command for review per existing policy. When either the Chief or her/his designee determines that the allegations warrant investigation, such investigation shall be approved, and IA will initiate the investigative process.

(f) Internal Affairs will notify the OPO of all administrative interviews on all complaints of a serious matter (complaints that could lead to suspension, demotion or discharge) and all complaints originating at the OPO. The OPO may attend and observe interviews, and will be given the opportunity to ask questions after the completion of questioning by the Department. The OPO will not participate in criminal investigations of Department employees but will be notified when the criminal case is concluded.

(g) Upon completion of investigations, IA will forward a complete copy of the case file to the OPO for review. The OPO will determine whether the investigation was thorough and objective.

(h) As a part of the review process, the OPO may conclude that additional investigation is needed on issues deemed material to the outcome. If there is any dispute between the assigned investigator(s) and the OPO regarding the necessity, practicality or materiality of the requested additional investigation, the Chief (or designee) will determine whether additional investigation will be undertaken. If the OPO is not satisfied with the determination of the Chief, the matter will be resolved by the Mayor, who's decision will be final. Once the matter has been referred to and resolved by the Mayor, the investigation will be completed consistent with the determination by the Mayor. After completion of the additional investigation, or the conclusion that no further investigation will be undertaken, the OPO will then certify whether or not, in the opinion of the OPO, the internal investigation was thorough and objective. This determination will be made within five business days. Once the above finding is entered in the investigation, the OPO will not he involved further in the disciplinary process in that case.

(i) All disciplinary decisions will be made by the Chief (or designee).

(j) The OPO will be provided a copy of any letter or other notification to an officer informing them of actual discipline imposed as a result of an internal affairs investigation or any Notice of Finding in the event that the complaint is not sustained.

(k) The OPO will be notified by IA within five business days of case closure of all complaints of a Serious Matter and all complaints originated by the OPO. The OPO, in addition to the Department's written Notice of Finding letter to the complainant, may send a closing letter to the complainant. The letter may summarize the case findings.

(1) Any complaining party who is not satisfied with the findings of the Department concerning their complaint may contact the Office of Police Ombudsman to discuss the matter further. However, unless persuasive and probative new information is provided, the investigation will remain closed. In accordance with established arbitral case law, employees may not be disciplined twice for the same incident. In the event the investigation is re-opened and discipline imposed, the appropriate burden of establishing compliance with this section rests with the City in any subsequent challenge to the discipline.

(m) In addition to the investigative process, the OPO will have unimpeded access to all complaint and investigative files for auditing and reporting purposes. The OPO shall not retain investigative files beyond one year and will return the same to Internal Affairs for safekeeping. At all times and including, without limitation, issuing written reports, the OPO will not release the name(s) of employees or other individuals involved in incidents or investigations nor any other personally identifying information. The OPO may make statistical observations regarding the disciplinary results of sustained internal investigations, hut shall not take issue with discipline imposed by the Chief of Police in

specific cases.

(n) The OPO may recommend policies and procedures for the review and/or audit of the complaint resolution process, and review and recommend changes in departmental policies to improve the quality of police investigations and practices. Nothing herein shall be construed as a waiver of the Guilds right to require the City to engage in collective bargaining as authorized by law.

(o) A committee of five (5) members (Committee) will be formed that will recommend three (3) candidates for the OPO position to the Mayor (one of which must be selected). The Committee shall be composed of one member appointed by the Spokane Police Officers Guild; one member appointed by the Lieutenants and Captains Association; one member appointed by the President of the City Council, one member appointed by the Mayor, and a fifth member selected by the other four members.

(p) In addition to whatever job requirements may be established by the City, one of the minimum job requirements for the OPO will be to have a history that includes the establishment of a reputation for even-handedness in dealing- with both complainants and the regulated parties. The City also agrees that compliance with the confidentiality provisions of this agreement will be a condition of employment for the OPO.

Inadvertant, de minimus disclosures shall not be considered a violation of this section.
(q) This agreement shall become a new article within the collective bargaining agreement upon ratification by both signatory parties. Alleged violations of this agreement are subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions of the bargaining agreement. In the event the Guild believes a candidate recommended by the Committee for OPO does not meet the minimum job requirement established in Section (0) above, the Guild must within three (3) days of the recommendation present information to the Mayor about their concern. If that person is ultimately selected by the Mayor, the Guild may file a grievance within five (5) days of the appointment and an expedited arbitration process will be utilized to resolve the matter. The Arbitrator will conduct an arbitration within twenty one (21) days, and issue a bench decision. The decision will be final and binding upon the parties. Upon the filing of a grievance, the appointment shall be held in abeyance pending completion of the arbitration. As a part of the ratification of this agreement, the City agrees to repeal Section 04.26.010 of the Spokane Municipal Code in its entirety within 60 days of the agreement's execution.

(r) It is agreed that upon implementation of the OPO, Article 24, Section E of the collective bargaining agreement will be modified as follows:

Section E - Police Officer Rights in Discipline
Administrative investigations must be completed within 180 days of the matter coming to the attention of the Department (Bureau Command Staff or above) In the event the Office of the Chief believes an extension beyond 180 days is necessary, and the City can show that it has acted with due diligence and the investigation could not be reasonably be completed due to factors beyond the control of the Department (including, but not limited

to, for example, extended illness or other unavailability of a critical witness (i.e. - the complainant, the officer being investigated), or necessary delays in the processing of forensic evidence by other agencies,) the Chief must contact the Guild prior to the expiration of the 180 days seeking to extend the time period. Any request for extension based on the unavailability of witnesses shall include a showing that the witness is expected to become available in a reasonable period of time. A request for extension based upon the above criteria will not be unreasonably denied. The period of investigation may also be extended by mutual agreement between the Guild President and the Chief.

The 180 day period shall be suspended when a complaint involving alleged criminal conduct is being reviewed by a prosecuting authority or is being prosecuted at the city, state or federal level, or if the alleged conduct occurred in another jurisdiction and is being criminally investigated or prosecuted in that jurisdiction. In cases of an officer involved fatal incident, the 180 day period will commence when the completed criminal file is provided to the Prosecuting Attorney, and will only be tolled in the event criminal charges are filed.

In the event an outside agency conducts a criminal investigation of a matter within the jurisdiction of the City, and the Department receives the completed criminal file with less than sixty (60) days remaining for the administrative investigation, the Department will have up to an additional sixty (60) days to complete its administrative investigation; In no event, shall the investigation last more than 240 days.

Compliance with this provision is required if findings are to be entered or discipline is to be imposed. Issuance of a Loudermill notice of intent to discipline will constitute conclusion of the administrative investigation for purposes of this section.
Nothing in this article prohibits the City from disciplining (provided just cause exists) an officer convicted of a crime, or laying off an employee pursuant to Civil Service Rule IX, Section 6 (d).

NOTE: This language is effective upon ratification by the parties. The revision to Section E - Police Officer Rights in Discipline will be applicable to any investigations commenced after the parties ratify this agreement.

Exhibit 2 Full Text of Key PERC Decisions

City of Seattle, Decision 9957 (PECB, 2008)

STATE OF WASHINGTON

BEFORE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION

SEATTLE POLICE OFFICERS' GUILD,) CASE 20402-U-06-5

Complainant,	) DECISION 9957 - PECB
vs.	) CASE 20687-U-06-5271
	) DECISION 9958 - PECB
CITY OF SEATTLE,	) FINDINGS OF FACT,
	) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
Respondent.	) AND ORDER

Snyder and Hoag, LLC, by David Snyder, Attorney at Law, appeared for the union.

Thomas A. Carr, Seattle City Attorney, by Jean M. Boler, appeared for the employer.

On May 19, 2006, the Seattle Police Officers' Guild (union) filed an unfair labor practice complaint alleging that the City of Seattle (employer) bargained in bad faith with respect to an issue involving the citizen's police review process. A second complaint alleging failure to bargain changes in the police review process before bargaining had concluded in 2006 was filed October 5, 2006, and the two matters were consolidated. J. Martin Smith was appointed Examiner. A hearing was held on April 24 and 25, 2007, at Kirkland, Washington. Briefs were filed to complete the record.

ISSUES

1. Did the employer refuse to bargain and interfere with employee rights by changing a city ordinance altering the procedures of the Office of Professional Accountability Review Board (OPARB)?
2. Did the employer refuse to bargain in good faith by passing an ordinance that made changes effective before completion of the parties' collective bargaining procedure, including interest arbitration?

Based on the record as a whole, the Examiner rules that the employer's actions constitute a violation of RCW 41.56.140(1) and (4). The employer passed an ordinance that altered the process of the OPARB, and set an automatic effective date implementing that change prior to the completion of the collective bargaining process during 2006 and 2007. By these actions, the employer has failed in its duty to meet, confer and negotiate in good faith, and remedies are ordered herein.

RULE

The law of this case concerns general rules with regard to the obligation to bargain in good faith, as impacted by the nature of police and security work in the public sector. Since police officers negotiate under interest arbitration procedures pursuant to RCW

41.56.450, the parameters of these procedures must be included in any review by the Commission and its examiners.

The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith The parties in this case bargain collectively pursuant to the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act, Chapter 41.56 RCW. Their duty to bargain is defined in RCW 41.56.030(4), as follows:

"Collective bargaining" means . . . to meet at reasonable times, to confer and negotiate in good faith, and to execute a written agreement with respect to grievance procedures and collective negotiations on personnel matters, including wages, hours and working conditions . . . .

That duty is enforced through RCW 41.56.140(4) and unfair labor practice proceedings under RCW 41.56.160 and Chapter 391-45 WAC. Where an unfair labor practice is alleged, the complainant has the burden of proof. WAC 391-45-270(1)(a). The burden to establish affirmative defenses lies with the party asserting the defense. WAC 391-45-270(1)(b). The parties' collective bargaining obligations require that the status quo be maintained regarding all mandatory subjects of bargaining, and employers are prohibited from changing mandatory subjects of bargaining except where such changes are made in conformity with the collective bargaining obligation or the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. City of Yakima, Decision 3501-A (PECB, 1998), aff'd, 117 Wn.2d 655 (1991); Spokane County Fire District 9, Decision 3661-A (PECB, 1991); City of Tacoma, Decision 4539-A (PECB, 1994).

A complainant alleging a "unilateral change" must establish the relevant status quo. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, Decision 2746-B (PECB, 1989). In general, the bargaining obligation allows for changes to be made, but the employer must first give notice to the exclusive bargaining representative, and provide that organization a meaningful opportunity to bargain the subject. South Kitsap School District, Decision 472 (PECB, 1978) (citing Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964)). Such notice must be timely, giving sufficient time in advance of the actual implementation of a change to allow a reasonable opportunity for bargaining between the parties. City of Vancouver, Decision 808 (PECB, 1980). Such a requirement affords the union the opportunity to explore all the possibilities, provide counter-arguments and offer alternative solutions or proposals regarding the issue raised by the proposed change. Spokane County, Decision 2377 (PECB, 1986). The respondent has the burden of proving that actual notice was given within a time period in which the exclusive bargaining representative could take effective action on behalf of the affected employees. City of Tukwila, Decision 2434-A (PECB, 1987); Lake Stevens School District, Decision 9840 (PECB, 2007).

With bargaining units like county sheriff's departments and city police departments, however, the parties are subject to RCW 41.56.440 and successive provisions which state that the wages, hours, and other conditions of employment in a police contract remain and "shall not be changed" during the pendency of proceedings before an arbitration

panel. See RCW 41.56.470. This means that employers are put to a unique limitation on the right to effect changes during bargaining or even after a contract has terminated. City of Seattle, Decision 1667-A (PECB, 1984).

General Police Work
The work of city police departments is well known and visible to the public. In addition, police departments and their activities are subject to particular rules about how to bargain and negotiate under RCW 41.56.440, .450 and .470. While many police department policies are contained in Procedures Manuals or even the labor contract, some policies are set out by the legislative body of the employing municipality, as by city ordinance. Such is the case here. If an employer seeks a change in policy, those changes must be real and provable. Newspaper reports that a police practice will be changed are not sufficient. City of Tacoma, Decision 9157 (PECB, 2005). There must be a proven change from a verifiable past practice. Whatcom County, Decision 7288 (PECB, 2001).

APPLICATION

Background Analysis As counsel ably demonstrate in their respective memoranda, this case requires a summary of the facts and history which lead up to the filing of this charge.

The issues in this case surround a controversial police officer review system in Seattle's police department, and how recent changes to that system impacted working conditions and bargaining unit members of the representative union.(fn:1) In 1999, the Seattle City Council adopted the Office of Professional Accountability (OPA), which was granted an independent review authority to audit, examine and review arrest records and contacts between Seattle police officers and citizens. The examinations were based upon "citizen complaints," and not police department action, because certain citizen groups had complained of harassment and aggressive police tactics. Ordinance 119825 was the result, also creating an independent "auditor" position and a secondary review panel called the Office of Professional Accountability Review Board.

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fn:1 Much of the record in this case is composed of official documents between the City of Seattle and union representatives, but the entire controversy resulted in prevalent media scrutiny by Seattle newspaper and television stations. Certain photos and video of police incidents and arrest are well-known to the public and the parties, but are not relied upon by the Examiner.

During negotiation of the labor agreement in 2000, the union agreed to certain changes in OPA and department-wide internal investigation procedures, and to a three-member panel review system for OPARB. They also agreed that OPARB could review all redacted police complaint forms that had been filed by citizens outside the department.(fn:2)

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fn:2 The city council circulated a press release praising the agreement with the union on this issue.

In January of 2001, the parties initiated an interest arbitration procedure, and by mutual consent agreed to submit their tentative agreement to the arbitrator for purposes of drafting the exact terms of the settlement. Arbitrator Janet Gaunt issued those terms in an award on November 26, 2001. Gaunt's interpretation of the labor contract left intact the old Appendix E and set out specific powers of the OPARB. The redacted file rule was not changed. The city council was informed of the impacts of union negotiations in January of 2002.

During the 2001-2005 period, Chief Gil Kerlikowske disciplined certain officers, IIS (internal affairs investigations) took place as usual, and the OPA reviewed police-citizen conflicts in the same manner as they had prior to 2001.

After 2001 there emerged a growing effort by the OPARB panel to see more of the files and to be more "investigative." Members of the OPARB panel filed their own complaints or urged citizens to file claims with the OPA directly. Examples are:

* May 2001, a complaint filed by OPARB member Peter Holmes regarding a stolen property complaint from Sand Point (east Seattle);

* March 2004, a complaint from member Sheley Secrest regarding an arrest in South precinct;

* August 2004, a complaint from Secrest regarding excessive force in an arrest situation;

* May 2005, a complaint filed by Secrest regarding an arrest taking place that month;

* February 2006, a complaint from Holmes to John Fowler of the OPA, regarding a citizen complaint in November of 2005.

During the summer of 2005, it became evident that OPARB supporters, unhappy with the chief, OPA and the mayor, began to plan a revised city ordinance which would enlarge OPARB's authority by allowing review of "unredacted" files. Holmes and the OPARB members engaged the OPA Director Sandra Pailca and City Attorney Tom Carr in a series of emails and letters in 2005-06. Pailca advised Holmes that talking to one citizen complainant in particular was ill-advised for safety's sake and involved an "open" file. In June 2005, Holmes again asked Pailca for (redacted) files which were late in arriving and complained that the chief had held up one of them. Pailca responded and said the redacted files were being transferred, but not the open case.

By September of 2005, Pailca had expressed concern about Holmes' request for the names of police officers disciplined more than three times,(fn:3) or who otherwise showed poor credibility records in court.

fn:3 The parties used a colloquialism "frequent flyers" to describe police officers who were often the subject of a citizen complaint to OPA. The Examiner prefers other terms.

Until this point, OPARB had no visible dispute with the union. But in March of 2006, union attorney Chris Vick sent a letter to David Bracilano, city labor relations coordinator, alerting him that rumors of an unredacted file ordinance would cause the Guild to file unfair labor practice claims, if no bargaining took place. The following week, Vick also demanded to bargain OPA-OPARB review processes.

The last chapter of the drama ensued in May of 2006. On May 30, Councilman Nick Licata sponsored, and the full council passed, an amendment to SMC 3.28.290(a). That ordinance provided in particular that:

AN ORDINANCE relating to Office of Professional Accountability (OPA) records reviewed by the Office of Professional Accountability Review Board (OPA Review Board); providing that the OPARB will have access to unredacted OPA files. . . . . WHEREAS, in its December 2002 report the OPA Review Board observed that the process of redacting OPA files is unnecessarily labor intensive for the OPA, is nonproductive, and is a practical impediment to its work . . . . redaction prevents it from determining patterns of complaints against particular officers or within specific precincts. . . . . . . NOW, THEREFORE, . . .
. . .
[A] . . . the OPA Review Board shall have access to unredacted complaint forms of all OPA complaints and unredacted files of all closed OPA investigations. . . .
[B] [disclosure rules amended].

Exhibit 6. (emphasis added). The ordinance included an effective date of March 31, 2007, some ten months later.

The remainder of the new ordinance cautioned that OPARB members could not disclose information from the OPA files, nor could the periodic reports reveal officers' badge numbers, addresses, e-mail addresses or other "identifying information." The new ordinance also included a "hold harmless" clause, protecting OPARB members from any legal effects of disclosure.

There was no acknowledgment of the union's demand to bargain until July 12, 2006, when the city labor negotiator sent a letter to union president Rich O'Neill -- presumably, an opening proposal for a 2007-2008 labor contract. There were 16 main items, numbers 11-13 of which addressed the OPA-OPARB files issue. The very first request was for access to un-redacted files in accordance with the "recently passed City Ordinance."

Not mentioned in the employer's bargaining letter was the unique ordinance provision that made it effective March 31, 2007, "to allow an opportunity to collectively bargain

the effects of any of this ordinance's provisions on the wages, hours and working conditions of SPOG members. . ."

Occasionally the OPARB requested particular (closed) OPA files which had not been randomly selected for their review but involved situations that the members learned about from the community. Those files were redacted and provided to OPARB. During the 2005-06 period, OPARB actually saw and reviewed one IIS file which provided the names of police officers in eleven instances, and the names of investigating police department personnel. These documents were intended to be redacted but omissions in the process happened. These omissions did not change the relevant status quo.

Eventually, the OPA continued to prepare files for review by OPARB. OPARB received ten un-redacted files from November of 2006 and eight un-redacted files which had been closed during December 2006. The OPARB also received ten un-redacted and closed January 2007 files on April 5, 2007. No reports from 2006 or 2007 were made a part of the record in this case.

Case Analysis on Failure to Bargain

The Effect of the May 2006 Ordinance The Examiner concludes that the employer changed a mandatory topic for bargaining at both the decision and effect levels. All of the requisite features are met. Specifically,

a. The Status Quo The policy which existed prior to May 2006, approved by Arbitrator Gaunt, was a redacted file rule. Between 2002 and 2005, the ordinance and the contract allowed only redacted files to go to the OPARB. The employer had proposed eliminating the redacted file requirement during bargaining in 2003, but withdrew the proposal and signed a collective bargaining agreement through 2006 which left Appendix E in place. As to the confidentiality rule, OPARB members were barred by the ordinance from revealing testimony and information about a particular case, and were barred from disclosing information they reviewed. The labor contract was consistent with this rule.

Although the employer attempted through bargaining to change the rule in 2003, the reports written in 2003 and 2004 depended on closed, redacted files. The record is evident that the city council made a public determination that it would oppose OPA and chief of police policies and the requirements of the collective bargaining agreement and instead direct a new set of policies that tilted away from OPA and the labor contract. (fn:4) This remains a clear and unmistakable change in the status quo, and raises problems with the obligation to bargain under RCW 41.56.450.

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fn:4 The Examiner will not rule on whether OPARB members' encouragement of the filing of claims with the OPA was improper behavior, but it is clear that it concerned Pailca, the chief and the mayor. See the July 12, 2005 letter from Holmes to OPA Director Pailca asking her to look into allegations from a personal acquaintance; and, attempts by OPARB members to file OPA complaints over their own signatures on behalf of city residents.

b. Timely Notice to the Union. The union concedes that it first received notice of the employer's plans to change the ordinance in March of 2006 when Rich O'Neill met with Councilman Nick Licata. The employer acknowledged that the union made a demand to bargain after that meeting, but continued to seek the ordinance change on April 10, 2006, and passed it on May 31, 2006. The employer also included the change in its proposal to the union on July 12, 2006. Even with a problematical linkage to make the ordinance effective on March 31, 2007, the employer shows on these facts that it gave notice to the union in compliance with RCW 41.56.140. The employer made a timely statement of the changes.

c. Union Makes a Timely Request to Bargain The union also made a timely demand to bargain the changes in accordance with South Kitsap School District, Decision 472.(fn:5) Here, the union made a timely request to bargain the decision and effects of the ordinance change in March of 2006, after rumors surfaced, and again in July after bargaining commenced for a successor agreement. The unfair labor practice complaint, filed here on May 19, 2006, was timely as to the redacted file and confidentiality rules.

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fn:5 But see discussion regarding the distinction between bargaining the decision to make the change, and the effects of the change.

The Examiner is invited to discuss the union's "alternative" fait accompli argument under Clover Park School District, Decision 8534-A (PECB, 2004). In Clover Park, the Commission firmly stated that a union would not be subject to a "waiver" defense when the employer established a "complete planned change" related to the parking fees for staff. A fait accompli was established, and the union endured unfair disadvantage in requesting bargaining. But since the facts here demonstrate that the employer gave timely notice and the union made an early and even pre-emptive demand to bargain, it makes better sense to analyze this case along the lines of unilateral change and failure to bargain, as is required by the cases following City of Seattle, Decision 1667-A.

d. Ordinance Subject is a Mandatory Topic The Examiner concludes that the ordinance changes impacted a mandatory topic for bargaining, and especially the potential for discipline of bargaining unit employees. In determining whether a particular matter is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, the Commission initially determines whether such a matter directly impacts the wages, hours, or working conditions of bargaining unit employees. Lower Snoqualmie Valley School District, Decision 1602 (EDUC, 1983). Managerial decisions that only remotely affect terms and conditions of employment, and decisions that are predominantly "managerial prerogatives," are classified as permissive subjects. IAFF Local 1052 v. PERC, 113 Wn.2d 197 (1989). In the facts of this case, the topic of redacted files for the police review boards impacts closely on the working conditions of the employees, since there is a clear potential for scrutiny and discipline by their employer.

The employer depends upon a classic "balancing test" analysis as to whether the redacted file rule and the constraints of confidentiality comprise a mandatory topic. The question asked is, does the topic go to the core of entrepreneurial control, or does it have some or no direct bearing on wages, hours or conditions of employment? King County Fire District 43, Decision 9236 (PECB, 2006). The employer also relies on IAFF Local 1052 v. PERC for the proposition that the police review board is a "management function" at the core of the city's responsibilities. It also cites City of Spokane, Decision 5054 (PECB, 1995), and asserts that PERC's finding of a mandatory topic there is distinguishable because it involved review of the chief firing officers. The difference between this case and Spokane is scant.(fn:6)

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fn:6 Remarkably enough, the union in that case also filed its unfair labor practice complaint upon hearing rumors that the city council would pass a resolution. In addition, the mission statement of the Spokane Citizen Review Panel and its secondary review panel is almost identical in scope as the OPA-OPARB system.

For the most part, the Examiner is not surprised, and concurs with the union's reliance upon City of Yakima, Decision 3503 (PECB, 1990), for the proposition that civil service rules covering discipline of police officers are mandatory topics which should have been bargained. The Examiner also relies upon the holding of City of Pasco, Decision 4197-A (PECB 1994), dealing with vehicle accident and firearm incident reporting. In Pasco, it was a mandatory topic to change the method by which officers were disciplined by a review board. Impacts on officer discipline were clear. The Examiner further relies on City of Pullman, Decision 8086-A (PECB, 2003), where a decision to tape record interviews in police disciplinary cases could lead to further discipline and hence was held to be a mandatory subject for negotiation. The Commission cautioned in City of Pullman, Decision 8086-A, that "impatience with the collective bargaining process" was no excuse for the employer to refuse to bargain. Such "excuses" are not acceptable in the instant case.

The Examiner credits that the City of Seattle has always taken the OPA and OPARB functions seriously, and wanted their activities to be visible, accountable, and public. In his testimony, Assistant Director of OPA, John Fowler, depicted patiently how the OPA handled citizen complaints and revealed that "traditional standing" requirements did not exist: any citizen could file a complaint about any police employee. The complaints could be anonymous. Fowler's tone was to emphasize the aspect of "total transparency" -- a public encouragement of citizens without fear or anxiety to file complaints over their encounters with uniformed officers.(fn:7) In his view, a philosophy of transparency motivated the OPARB to review only randomly selected and closed OPA files. In later testimony, OPARB chairman Holmes also used the term "transparency."

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fn:7 PERC is familiar with employee concerns about anonymity and privacy in the workplace, supporting the right of nursing employees not to wear identifying name-tags in a large jail facility. See King County, Decision 5810-A (PECB, 1997), aff'd, 94 Wn. App. 431 (1999).

Neither Holmes nor Fowler's testimony deflects from an obvious conclusion -- the redacted file rule and the confidentiality standards for reviewing complaints by citizens are not de minimis, and can have a direct impact on employee working conditions, especially related to discipline. Elements of the city government beyond OPA and OPARB were concerned as well: Sandra Pailca of OPA was concerned about continuing pressures from Holmes and OPARB to read open (not only closed) files. That concern was shared by the chief of police. OPA also knew about pressures from OPARB to reveal "frequent flyers" or even a software system to identify police officers who were deserving of special scrutiny by the citizen panel. In fact, the OPARB implied that the redaction requirement could be used to identify officers frequently complained about by citizens. This is evidence of the clear connection between redaction of the files and employee working conditions. Also, another level of review could adversely impact an officer's ability to testify truthfully and fully in a court of law, which is necessary to convict suspected and arrested citizens. Since discipline of an employee can ultimately affect whether that employee continues to be employed, matters that affect discipline have long been held to be mandatory subjects of bargaining. In the face of such serious consequences for its officers, it is strange that the city and its council were so "impatient" with the bargaining process in May of 2006.(fn:8)

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fn:8 The Examiner in City of Spokane, Decision 5054, accurately pointed out that the new CRP created yet another opportunity for a an officer to be disciplined, even if the chief of police concluded that the officer's conduct was justified. That would happen in this matter as well.

In the Examiner's view, Holmes and OPARB cannot explain these events away. The employer cannot explain away any distinctions between this case and Spokane County, where the topic of who would sit on police review boards was ruled to be mandatory. If anything, the instant case is more mandatory than Spokane, since it more directly touches concerns and impacts on working conditions, and especially discipline.

Both the decision to change the redaction requirement and its effects are mandatory subjects of bargaining.

Before the collective bargaining procedure was concluded, the employer changed the redacted file and confidentiality rules for OPARB. The Examiner concludes that the employer did not allow a reasonable time for bargaining the decision to change the redacted file rule, since it had unilaterally decided that it would only bargain (unspecified) effects of that decision.

With respect to the employer's obligation to bargain the effects of the change, the Examiner further concludes that the employer's enactment of the ordinance violated its good faith obligations. Establishing an effective date for implementation of changes in a

bargaining unit eligible for statutory interest arbitration is inherently problematic. City of Seattle, Decision 1667-A, requires that even a single proposed mid-term change to a mandatory subject proceed through the required negotiation process, including mediation and interest arbitration if the parties are unable to reach agreement. Here, the changes were to become effective during the time when bargaining might still be taking place, or when the parties might legally submit their issues to binding interest arbitration. Even if this passage of time might have provided an "opportunity" to bargain, with the possibility of reaching agreement, the employer made only one proposal during that period. Most important is that the automatic effective date of March 31, 2007, presumed a right not provided under the provisions of the statute involving uniformed employees. It is therefore necessary to find a violation of RCW 41.56.140.

a. Reasonable time for bargaining As noted in City of Vancouver, Decision 808 (PECB, 1980), the employer must afford the union a reasonable time for bargaining once it has indicated that a change is imminent. The record here indicates an off-hand approach to negotiations, which expressed the result first, and the rationale of the proposal last. The employer only announced the city council decision at the bargaining table, and that it would be effective ten months later. The employer deployed the hopeful (but wrong) belief that the union would only need to negotiate the effects but not the decision to accept an un-redacted file rule. The changes in the OPARB procedures, both relating to the redacted file policy and the confidentiality requirements for OPARB members, were carried out at city council chambers rather than the bargaining table. The employer failed to provide or participate in meaningful collective bargaining on this issue, and it made no proposals after July of 2006, when negotiations began.

It is instructive to follow the timeline concerning discussions about the redacted files issue:

* In 2002, Arbitrator Gaunt retained Appendix E in the collective bargaining agreement;
* In June of 2005, OPARB Chairman Holmes requested names of officers involved in discipline, and open files being reviewed by OPA; OPARB members filed citizen complaints with OPA;

* In March of 2006, the union was informed that an ordinance was being proposed to change the redacted file and confidentiality rules, despite Appendix E of the labor agreement;

* In June of 2006, the city council passed the new ordinance, changing Seattle Municipal Code 3.28 but not the labor contract;

* On July 12, 2006, the city officially proposed to amend Appendix E and the labor contract by incorporating the elements of the new ordinance;

* On September 15, 2006, the Guild requested PERC mediation, and the first meeting was held on November 13, 2006;

* During April 2007 and the time of hearing on the matter, mediation continued, and no successor agreement was achieved;

* Effective April 1, 2007, the un-redacted file policy was implemented and files from November 2006 and more current were forwarded to OPARB.

The ordinance amendments of 2006 clearly resulted from OPARB's discussions with Councilman Licata and certain members on the city council. They did not result from collective bargaining.(fn:9)

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fn:9 Union attorney Vick's testimony was credible in stating the pattern of conversation between 2005 and 2006, and between the union negotiators and the employer. No one who bargained for the city actually testified, and the employer otherwise created no shadows or doubts about what was said at the bargaining table. John Fowler, on the OPA's behalf, did not rebut any of the union's claims.

b. Negotiation of the OPARB confidentiality and hold harmless rules Peter Holmes and the city council sought a more protective rule which held the panelists harmless against attempts to prosecute or file legal claims in the event a fragment of file information was revealed to the press or the community.(fn:10) In many cases, a city government's effort to hold its public board members harmless in the event they revealed information deemed to be confidential would not impact labor contracts or public employees. But that is not the case here. The new ordinance created a more protective rule because it was predicated on the idea that the OPARB would see more and know more about citizen complaints made the prior year, and they would know more only because of the un-redacted file rule.

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fn:10 Note also that no resolution was reached as to whether OPARB members needed their own attorney appointed, since City Attorney Carr held firm in January 2006 that city counsel would be adequate for this purpose.

Holmes and John Fowler of the OPA were the only City of Seattle witnesses. While generally credible, their testimony regarding their rationale and the concerns leading to their belief that a change in practice was necessary does not change the fact that the employer was required to negotiate such changes. Release of an officer's name or badge number, and consequent discipline or scrutiny, impacts a mandatory topic of bargaining under RCW 41.56.140. Whether an urge to focus on police officers frequently in trouble with elements of the community is political or necessary is not for PERC to say. But the actions taken by the employer here constitute exactly the type of "impatience with the collective bargaining process" which we ruled to be illegal in City of Pullman, Decision 8086-A.

The redacted file and confidentiality rules are tied together. Since the employer proposed them in the same document and negotiated them in the same manner, they failed the reasonable-time-for negotiation test and hence violated RCW 41.56.140.

CONCLUSION

Based on the exhibits and the testimony of Chris Vick, John Fowler, and Peter Holmes, the Examiner concludes that the employer violated the obligation to bargain in good faith when it unilaterally adopted a change in the confidentiality and redacted files rule utilized by OPARB and OPA. Both the decision and effects of that change were mandatory topics for bargaining and subject to the mediation and interest arbitration procedures of RCW 41.56.450 - .905.

The normal remedy in this type of case is to return the parties to the bargaining table. The parties are directed to return to the bargaining table and seek to resolve these two issues prior to March 31, 2008. This time period is to include any period of mediation by one of the Commission's mediators. The parties may have understood their positions in mid-2006, but did not return to the issues because of the intervention of the unfair labor practice claims. The parties need to address the "impatience" and time-lines problem. City of Pullman, Decision 8086-A. The parties also must negotiate the impacts of OPARB reports written for years 2006 and 2007, since those reports may contain or utilize information from un-redacted files.

If impasse remains on matters concerning the decision and its effects as of April 1, 2008, the parties shall submit any such issues to interest arbitration in accordance with RCW 41.56.450 - .905.

Otherwise, the employer is directed to restore the status quo ante and to rescind the un-redacted file and confidentiality/indemnification rules contained in Ordinance 122126.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The City of Seattle is a municipal corporation and an employer within the meaning of RCW 41.56.030(1).

2. The Seattle Police Officers' Guild (union) is a labor organization and exclusive bargaining representative within the meaning of RCW 41.56.030(3).

3. The Office of Professional Accountability (OPA), established in 1999 by the city council, reviews citizen complaints about police conduct. The OPA was granted independent review authority to audit, examine and review arrest records and contacts between police officers and citizens. At the same time it established the OPA, the city council also created an independent "auditor" position and a secondary review panel called the Office of Professional Accountability Review Board (OPARB).

4. During negotiation of their collective bargaining agreement in 2000, the employer and the union agreed to implement certain changes to OPA and OPARB. The parties agreed to allow review of "all redacted files" of closed citizen complaint cases, and those stemming from internal investigations. The practice of providing only redacted, closed police conduct review files to the OPARB established the status quo for future collective bargaining.

5. The parties to these proceedings are subject to the interest arbitration provisions of RCW 41.56.450 - .905. They initiated a statutory interest arbitration procedure in January 2001. In November of 2001, Arbitrator Janet Gaunt ruled that certain changes to the labor agreement were to be made, but did not change the "redacted file" rule under Appendix E of the agreement.

6. During bargaining in 2003, the employer proposed eliminating the redacted file requirement. It ultimately withdrew that proposal and signed a collective bargaining agreement through the end of 2006 that left the redacted file rule in place. That collective bargaining agreement continued to include language barring OPARB members from disclosing information about a particular case.

7. Occasionally the OPARB requested particular (closed) OPA files which had not been randomly selected for their review but involved situations that the members learned about from the community. Those files were redacted and provided to OPARB.

8. In mid-2005, members of the OPARB complained to OPA Director Sandra Pailca that a review of a redacted internal investigation file limited the OPARB ability to respond to issues, because the names of both the police officer and the victim were redacted and deleted from the reports.

9. During the 2005-2006 period, OPARB actually saw and reviewed one IIS file which provided the names of police officers in eleven instances, and the names of investigating police department personnel. These documents were intended to be redacted but omissions in the process happened. These omissions did not change the relevant status quo.

10. In March 2006, City Councilman Nick Licata met with the union president and informed him that the city council planned to change the city ordinance regarding file redaction and confidentiality matters relating to OPARB. Following that meeting, in March 2006, union attorney Chris Vick sent a letter to Labor Relations Coordinator David Bracilano, alerting him that the union would file unfair labor practice claims if the employer adopted an un-redacted file ordinance without bargaining. The union also made a separate and timely request to bargain the decision and effects of changing the confidentiality and redaction-of-files process in March 2006.

11. On May 30, 2006, the city council adopted a change to Seattle Municipal Ordinance 3.28.290(a). That change, to become effective on March 31, 2007, allowed OPARB to review un-redacted files from the OPA investigations. The city council also changed

certain confidentiality requirements for OPARB board members, in an attempt to hold the members harmless in the event un-redacted file information was improperly revealed to the public or the media.

12. The employer did not bargain any of these matters with the union prior to adopting the ordinance change in May 2006.

13. The employer and union began negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement in July 2006, at which time the union repeated its request to bargain concerning the decision and effects of the confidentiality and un-redacted file issues. At that time, the employer made a bargaining proposal that included access to un-redacted files in accordance with the "recently passed City Ordinance." On September 15, 2006, the union requested a Commission mediator to assist with the negotiations. Mediation continued during April 2007 and the time of the hearing. The employer made no further proposals on these subjects during the course of bargaining, and the parties reached no agreement on these issues. Commission docket records reveal no request as yet to certify the parties to interest arbitration under RCW 41.56.450 - .905.

14. The OPARB received ten un-redacted closed OPA files on April 5, 2007, including cases closed in January of 2007. They also received eight un-redacted files from December of 2006 and ten un-redacted files which were closed during November 2006.

15. The issue of whether files provided to the OPA and OPARB are redacted directly concerns working conditions and discipline of employees within the bargaining unit. The confidentiality rules for members of OPARB are directly tied to the redacted-file issue, and thus to employee working conditions. Because of the direct connection of these matters to employee working conditions, both the decision to change the redaction and confidentiality rules and the effects of the decision are mandatory subjects of bargaining.

16. Absent agreement through the collective bargaining process, both statutory and case law preclude an employer from making changes to the status quo regarding mandatory subjects of bargaining in a bargaining unit subject to the interest arbitration provisions of Chapter 41.56 RCW.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Public Employment Relations Commission has jurisdiction in these cases under Chapter 41.56 RCW.

2. By adopting a city ordinance containing a new, un-redacted file policy and a new policy enhancing the confidentiality and hold harmless provisions of OPARB assignments, without bargaining the decision to do so, the employer refused to bargain in violation of RCW 41.56.140(4) and interfered with employee rights in violation of RCW 41.56.140(1).

3. By adopting a city ordinance containing a new, un-redacted file policy and a new confidentiality policy with a specified effective date, the employer did not satisfy its duty to negotiate in good faith, and violated RCW 41.56.140(4) and (1).

4. By making only one proposal in collective bargaining regarding the effects of the un-redacted file and confidentiality policies, the employer failed to bargain in good faith in violation of RCW 41.56.140(4) and (1).

5. By implementing a city ordinance containing a new, un-redacted file policy and a new confidentiality policy prior to reaching agreement with the union or receipt of an interest arbitration award concerning those issues, the employer failed to bargain in good faith in violation of RCW 41.56.140(4) and (1).

ORDER

The City of Seattle, its officers and agents, shall immediately take the following actions to remedy its unfair labor practices:

1. CEASE AND DESIST from:

a. Refusing to meet, confer and negotiate with the Seattle Police Officers' Guild with regard to the decision to change the redacted file and confidentiality practices of the OPARB, and the effects of those changes;

b. Adopting a specific effective date for changes to redacted file and confidentiality practices of the OPARB, without first having satisfied its bargaining obligation;

c. Implementing changes to OPARB redacted file and confidentiality practices without first reaching agreement in collective bargaining or receiving an interest arbitration award on those issues pursuant to RCW 41.56.450;

d. In any other manner interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of their collective bargaining rights under by the laws of the state of Washington.

2. TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION to effectuate the purposes and policies of Chapter 41.56 RCW:

a. Give no further effect to city council Ordinance # 122126 which changed the OPARB confidentiality and redacted file practices.

b. Purge all findings and records of the OPARB based on any un-redacted files reviewed for 2006 or 2007, and return any un-redacted documents and files from that time period to the OPA.

c. Restore the status quo ante by reinstating the wages, hours, and working conditions which existed for the employees in the affected bargaining unit prior to the unilateral change in the redacted file and confidentiality practices.

d. Give notice to and, upon request, negotiate in good faith with Seattle Police Officers' Guild regarding the redaction of documents and confidentiality issues.

e. If no agreement is reached in negotiations on these issues by March 31, 2008, submit any remaining issues on these matters to interest arbitration. Submit a request for interest arbitration of such remaining issues to the Public Employment Relations Commission by April 20, 2008.

f. Post copies of the notice attached to this order in conspicuous places on the employer's premises where notices to all bargaining unit members are usually posted. This notice shall be duly signed by an authorized representative of the respondent, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of initial posting. The respondent shall take reasonable steps to ensure that such notices are not removed, altered, defaced, or covered by other material.

g. Read the notice attached to this order into the record at a regular, public meeting of the Seattle City Council, and permanently append a copy of the notice to the official minutes of the meeting where the notice is read as required by this paragraph.

h. Notify the complainant, in writing, within 20 days following the date of this order, as to what steps have been taken to comply with this order, and at the same time provide the complainant with a signed copy of the notice attached to this order.

i. Notify the Compliance Officer of the Public Employment Relations Commission, in writing, within 20 days following the date of this order, as to what steps have been taken to comply with this order, and at the same time provide the Compliance Officer with a signed copy of the notice attached to this order.

ISSUED at Olympia, Washington, this 23rd day of January, 2008.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION

J. MARTIN SMITH, Examiner

This order will be the final order of the agency unless a notice of appeal is filed with the Commission under WAC 391-45-350.

Cases 20402-U-06-5196 and 20687-U-06-5271

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
NOTICE

THE WASHINGTON PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION CONDUCTED A LEGAL PROCEEDING IN WHICH ALL PARTIES HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT. THE COMMISSION RULED THAT WE COMMITTED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES IN VIOLATION OF STATE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAWS, AND ORDERED US TO POST THIS NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES:

WE UNLAWFULLY interfered with employee rights and failed to meet and negotiate in good faith regarding mandatory topics for bargaining, by adopting a city ordinance changing the OPARB reporting and redacted file procedure without bargaining the decision to do so with the Seattle Police Officers' Guild.

WE UNLAWFULLY interfered with employee rights and failed to meet and negotiate in good faith by adopting an implementation date of March 31, 2007, for those changes.

WE UNLAWFULLY interfered with employee rights and failed to meet and negotiate in good faith by making only one proposal in collective bargaining regarding the effects of the un-redacted file and confidentiality practices.

WE UNLAWFULLY interfered with employee rights and failed to meet and negotiate in good faith by implementing a city ordinance containing new un-redacted file and confidentiality policies prior to reaching agreement with the Seattle Police Officers' Guild or receiving an interest arbitration award concerning those issues.

TO REMEDY OUR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES:

WE WILL purge all findings of the OPARB based on un-redacted files reviewed for 2006 and 2007, and return any un-redacted documents and files from that time period to the OPA;

WE WILL NOT give effect to Ordinance 122126;

WE WILL restore the status quo ante by reinstating the wages, hours, and working conditions which existed for bargaining unit employees prior to the change in the redacted file and confidentiality practices.

WE WILL, upon request, meet and negotiate with Seattle Police Officers' Guild with respect to mandatory topics of bargaining.

WE WILL submit any issues unresolved in bargaining by March 31, 2008, to statutory interest arbitration proceedings under RCW 41.56.450.

WE WILL NOT, in any other manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their collective bargaining rights under the laws of the State of Washington.

DATED: _________________ CITY OF SEATTLE

BY: ______________________________
Authorized Representative

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE.

This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days, and must not be altered or covered by any other material. Questions about this notice or compliance with the Commission's order may be directed to the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC), 112 Henry Street NE, Suite 300, PO Box 40919, Olympia, Washington 98504-0919. Telephone: (360) 570-7300. The full decision will be published on PERC's web site, www.perc.wa.gov.

CITY OF SPOKANE, DECISION 5054, 5055 (PECB, 1995)

Spokane Police Guild v. City of Spokane and Spokane Police Lieutenants and Captains Assn v. City of Spokane

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

On September 14, 1992, the Spokane Police Guild and the Spokane Police Lieutenants and Captains Association each filed a complaint with the Public Employment Relations

Commission, charging that the City of Spokane had violated RCW 41.56.140(4) by refusing to bargain concerning the creation of a "citizen's review panel" with the power to change actions based on police department internal investigations. Examiner Katrina I. Boedecker was designated to process the cases under Chapter 391-45 WAC. The parties requested several delays of these proceedings while they attempted to resolve the matters, but those settlement efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. The parties submitted a stipulated "Statement of Agreed Facts" on August 8, 1994, in lieu of having an evidentiary hearing. The parties filed their legal arguments by October 3, 1994.

BACKGROUND

The executive power in the city government of the city of Spokane rests in the city manager, who serves at the pleasure of the city council. The city manager has delegated disciplinary power con-cerning uniformed police department employees to the police chief.

The ensuing paragraphs from the "statement of agreed facts" detail the factual background pertinent to these cases:

1. Prior to the fall of 1992, non-criminal charges made by a citizen against an employee of the Spokane Police Department were processed in the following manner:

> A. First, the complaint was forwarded to the police department's Office of pro-fessional Standards (OPS) ... If the allegation was serious (e.g., excessive force, false arrest), OPS staff investigated. If the allegation was non-serious (e.g., demeanor), it was routinely investigated by the shift supervisor.
>
> B. Next, the investigation was completed pursuant to OPS's procedure. Once all issues had been investigated and evidence gathered, the OPS commander or the shift supervisor submitted the completed file to the Administrative Review Panel (ARP) which consists of the assistant and deputy police chiefs and the four captains. The ARP reviewed each case completely and discussed it as a panel. The ARP then made a recommendation to the Police Chief.
>
> C. The Chief reviewed the complete OPS file and considered the ARP's recommendations. The Chief then made one of the following determinations: a) proper conduct; b) improper conduct; c) insufficient evidence; d) policy/ training/ equipment failure; e) mis-conduct not based on the original complaint; f) unfounded complaint (the allegation was demonstrably false). The Chief would then impose discipline, if appropriate. There was no higher level administrative review of the Chief's decision except through the appeal procedure to Civil Service or the parties grievance procedure. In neither case could the level of discipline im-

posed by the Chief, or his findings be increased to make the officer suffer a less favorable finding than the Chief had made.

2. During the Summer of 1992, the City Council was considering implementation of a "citizens review" process whereby citizens could appeal findings of proper conduct by the Chief. In response to publicity surrounding the proposal, the Guild's attorney contacted the City Attorney's office concerning the proposed CRP on June 26, 1992. ... The City Attorney's office responded to the Union's attorney. ... Neither party considered the Guild to have acquiesced to the City Council's plan.

On August 12, 1992, the employer responded by sending a draft resolution to be presented to the city council to establish the Citizens Review Panel (CRP) and an outline of the CRP process.

The city manager believed that the city charter gave him the authority needed to oversee the police chief's disciplinary actions. Without bargaining, the city council acted on August 24, 1992 to pass resolution 92-67, creating the CRP. The complainants objected to the council's action, and filed these unfair labor practice complaints.

The resolution defines the responsibilities and functions of the CRP, as follows:

1. The Citizens Review Panel shall be composed of eleven (11) citizens of the City of Spokane, appointed by the Mayor and the City Council. The Chief of Police shall recommend the appointment of four (4) of the members of the Citizens Review Panel.

2. The official functions of the Citizens Review Panel are:

a) to serve as a forum for citizens to bring their concerns about the police department's response to complaints investigated by Internal Affairs;

b)to review the results of investigations by Internal Affairs of complaints brought by citizens concerning the actions or omissions of officers and employees of the Spokane Police Department, while acting within the scope of their authority;

c) to monitor complaint trends to identify possible problem areas of police department activities in dealing with citizens.

...

5. If eight (8) members of the Citizens Review Panel vote to refer the matter to the Public Safety Committee for further review, the complaint is automatically transferred to the Chairman of the Public Safety Committee.

The CRP has been meeting regularly since its inception. It has developed a pamphlet describing its functions:

The Citizens Review Panel was formed to:

*__Serve as an independent forum__ for citizens to voice their concerns about the Spokane Police Department's response to complaints about performance and conduct;

*__Review the results__ of the Spokane Police Departments internal investigations of complaints brought by citizens concerning the actions or omissions of officers and employees of the Spokane Police Department;

*__Monitor complaint trends__ to identify possible areas of concern regarding the Spokane Police Department performance or conduct in dealing with citizens.

[Emphasis by *italics* and **bold** in original.]

Among the information in a "questions and answers" section, the pamphlet states:

What does the Citizens Review Panel do with my Complaint?

1. They gather all the available information from the Spokane Police Department.
2. They schedule a time when you can meet with the Panel and talk about the complaint issue. Members may have questions for you.
3. The Citizens Review Panel will decide to either (1) affirm the Spokane Police Department's findings or (2) refer your complaint to the Public Safety Committee for further action and/or investigation.

[Emphasis by **bold** in original.]

Even with the establishment of the CRP, a citizen still must first file a complaint with the Police Department, which processes it as described above. If the chief finds misconduct, the CRP has no jurisdiction to hear the citizen's complaint. Only if the chief resolves the complaint "not in favor of the citizen" (i.e., as proper conduct, insufficient evidence, unfounded, etc.), may the citizen forward the complaint to the CRP.

The CRP holds public hearings on all complaints brought before it. It may investigate. The CRP can recommend to the city council (through the public safety committee) that discipline be imposed.

Prior to the creation of the CRP, the OPS file was not disclosed outside the Police Department, except as required by law. Generally, this meant that findings would not be released if they did not conclude that the officer was culpable. Since its inception, the members of the CRP have been provided a copy of the complete investigative file. While the CRP has no policy on disclosure of the investigative file, the CRP has released such files when sought by members of the public or the news media.

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

The unions argue that when the employer created the CRP, it unilaterally changed its disciplinary procedures and subjected police officers to a new level of disciplinary review after they have already been cleared of wrongdoing. Additionally, the unions contend that the employer has unilaterally changed its past practice of maintaining confidentiality of internal investigation files on unsustained charges. It asserts that public disclosure of such information is not at the core of the city's entrepreneurial control, but is rather substantially invasive of the employee's privacy rights and inherently constitutes a working condition. Finally, the unions assert that the employer unilaterally changed its disciplinary procedures by subjecting police officers to public hearings concerning unsubstantiated citizen complaints.

The city argues that the formation of the CRP is not a mandatory subject of bargaining because the CRP does not have the authority to impact the disciplinary process. It contends that the city charter vests the city manager with the exclusive authority to discipline and he has designated the police chief to discipline police officers. The city argues that the CRP cannot actually affect the disciplinary process; rather it merely provides for an "organized group" to be the focus for complaints. Finally, the city asserts that the release of the files is not a change in working conditions and not a mandatory subject of bargaining, since the CRP receives only information that is generally available to the public.

DISCUSSION

Washington law is well settled that changes in disciplinary procedures constitute mandatory subjects of bargaining. City of Yakima, Decision 3503-A and 3504-A (PECB, 1990). Affirmed, City of Yakima v. IAFF, Local 469, 117 Wn.2d 655 (1991). City of Pasco, Decision 4197-A and 4198-A (PECB, 1994).

In the City of Pasco case, the employer had a procedure in which police-related traffic accidents and discharges of firearms were submitted to a "board of review", and a system of point values was used to classify police vehicle accidents and recommend disciplinary outcomes. The police chief replaced the "board of review" with a new "management review" procedure to deal with the same subject matters. The union sought to bargain over

the board of review during the negotiations on a successor agreement, but the employer refused to bargain on those issues. In finding the city of Pasco guilty of having committed unfair labor practices by unilaterally implementing changes in its disciplinary procedures, the Commission noted that "Discipline can affect tenure of employment, which is the ultimate 'working condition' within the traditional scope of 'wages, hours and working condition.' RCW 41.56.030(4)."

In the case at hand, the city of Spokane has similarly effected changes in disciplinary procedures. Prior to the unilateral imposition of the CRP, an officer would not face discipline if the chief concluded that the conduct was justified, or that there was insufficient evidence of misconduct, or if the charges were false. The CRP that was unilaterally imposed on these two bargaining units was specifically created to review officer conduct only if the chief failed to find misconduct. The CRP can recommend an increase in discipline from what the chief had decided. The recommendation of any discipline at all by the CRP is a greater sanction than a finding of no sustainable misconduct. Such procedures subject the bargaining unit members to institutionalized double jeopardy. "Institutionalized double jeopardy" is a working condition and should have been bargained prior to its implementation.

The employer's argument that since the CRP can only recommend discipline its acts do not constitute a working condition, is not persuasive. The record shows that the CRP can now publicly disclose information regarding unsustained information about bargaining unit members which had previously been considered confidential internal investigation material. In 1993, the State Supreme Court ruled in Dawson v. Daly, 120 WN.2d 782, (1993), that disclosure of a performance evaluation of a public employee would be "highly offensive to a reasonable person" and "not of legitimate concern to the public" unless there were specific acts of misconduct found in the evaluation. If all evaluations were open to scrutiny by "co-workers, neighbors, the press, or anyone else who made a request," the high court concluded that "employee morale would be seriously undermined, likely resulting in reduced job performance."

The internal investigation files which the CRP can now make public may have a specific finding that there has been no misconduct. The instant decision is not a ruling on the requirements of the Public Records Act, but this decision does find a parallel between performance evaluations where no misconduct is recorded and internal investigation files where no misconduct is recorded. The Supreme Court analysis that the public disclosure of a performance evaluation of a public employee would be "highly offensive to a reasonable person" holds for the public disclosure of an internal investigation file of a uniformed officer as well. Public disclosure of internal investigation files were no misconduct has been found is invasive of an employee's privacy rights and inherently constitutes a working condition. Public disclosure of unproven charges substantially effects a working condition and does not lie at the core of entrepreneurial control and thus constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining. See: International Association of Fire Fighters, Local Union 1052 v. The Public Employment Relations Commission, 113 Wn.2d 197 (1989).

Similarly, when the CRP holds a public hearing wherein a citizen complainant airs previously unsubstantiated allegations against an officer, such a hearing constitutes a working condition and its creation and functioning is a mandatory subject of bargaining.

When the city of Spokane failed to bargain over the creation and function of the CRP and unilaterally established an institutionalized double jeopardy scheme, it committed an unfair labor practice.

REMEDY

The standard remedy in a "unilateral change" unfair labor practice case is to restore the parties to the status quo ante as it existed before the illegal unilateral change. There appears to be no reason to deviate from that approach in this case. The Spokane City Council will be ordered to give no further effect to its resolution 92-67 which created the CRP without bargaining. The city will be ordered to purge all of the CRP's findings. If the city is still interested in pursuing the proposal of the creation of a CRP, it must discharge its duty to bargain with the complainants.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.The city of Spokane is a public employer within the meaning of RCW 41.56.030(1).

2.The Spokane Police Guild and the Spokane Police Lieutenants and Captains Association are bargaining representatives within the meaning of RCW 41.56.030(3) and each is the exclusive bargaining representative of an appropriate bargaining unit of uniformed personnel employed by the city of Spokane.

3.On August 24, 1992, the Spokane City Council enacted a resolution creating a Citizen Review Panel which would serve as a forum for citizens to bring concerns about the police departments response to complaints investigated by the department's internal affairs section. Specifically, a citizen could appeal a finding that an officer had acted properly.

4.The Citizen's Review Panel receives a copy of the complete investigative file. When sought by members of the public or the press, the Citizen's Review Panel releases the file. Previously, the police department's investigative file which concluded that an officer was not culpable, would not be released.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.The Public Employment Relations Commission has jurisdiction in these matters pursuant to Chapters 41.56 RCW and 391-45 WAC.

2.Disciplinary procedures are a mandatory subject of bargaining. Any changes in disciplinary procedures must be bargained in good faith by the parties. By its unilateral

creation of a Citizen's Review Panel, which has authority to, and actually does, release to the public information regarding disciplinary investigations which had previously been confidential in the police department, the employer has committed an unfair labor practice in violation of RCW 41.56.140(1) and (4).

ORDER

The city of Spokane, its officers and agents, shall immediately take the following actions to remedy its unfair labor practices:

A.CEASE AND DESIST from:

(1)Unilaterally making changes in disciplinary procedures.

(2)In any other manner, interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in their exercise of their collective bargaining rights secured by the laws of the state of Washington.

B.TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION to effectuate the purposes and policies of Chapter 41.56 RCW:

(1)Give no further effect to its resolution 92-67 which created the Citizens Review Panel.

(2) Purge all findings of the Citizens Review Panel.

(3)Post, in conspicuous places on the employer's premises where notices to all employees are usually posted, copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix". Such notices shall be duly signed by an authorized representative of the above-named respondent, and shall remain posted for 60 days. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the above-named respondent to ensure that such notices are not removed, altered, defaced, or covered by other material.

(4)Notify the above-named complainants, in writing, within 20 days following the date of this order, as to what steps have been taken to comply with this order, and at the same time provide the above-named complainant with a signed copy of the notice required by the preceding paragraph.

(5)Notify the Executive Director of the Public Employment Relations Commission, in writing, within 20 days following the date of this order, as to what steps have been taken to comply with this order, and at the same time provide the Executive Director with a signed copy of the notice required by this order.

ISSUED at Olympia, Washington, this 24TH day of April, 1995.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION

KATRINA I. BOEDECKER, Examiner

This order may be appealed by filing a petition for review with the Commission pursuant to WAC 391-45-350.

APPE
NDIX

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION NOTICE

THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION, A STATE AGENCY, HAS HELD A LEGAL PROCEEDING IN WHICH ALL PARTIES WERE ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT. THE COMMISSION HAS FOUND THAT WE HAVE COMMITTED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES IN VIOLATION OF A STATE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW, AND HAS ORDERED US TO POST THIS NOTICE TO OUR EMPLOYEES:

WE WILL NOT make unilateral changes in the disciplinary procedures of the Police Department.

WE WILL NOT give any further effect to our resolution 92-67 which created the Citizens Review Panel.

WE WILL purge all findings of the Citizens Review Panel.

WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights under the Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act, Chapter 41.56 RCW.

DATED:___________________

CITY OF SPOKANE

BY:_________________________________

AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE

This notice must remain posted for sixty (60) days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Public Employment Relations Commission, 603 Evergreen Plaza Building, Olympia, Washington 98504. Telephone: (206) 753-3444.

EXAMINER'S NOTE The parties' stipulation explains that OPS was "formerly known as Internal Affairs (IA), which now includes IA as one of its functions".

EXAMINER'S NOTE The letter from the union's attorney was attached to the Statement of Agreed Facts as an exhibit. It included a demand that the employer engage in collective bargaining with regard to any disciplinary procedures which the employer intended to change. He requested information as to how the proposed changes in the public advisory committee process would effect disciplinary procedures and noted, especially, that the complainants would be particularly interested in preserving confidential information, such as internal investigation files that did not result in discipline.

In Dawson, the Court was examining the public disclosure requirements of RCW 42.17.251. The Court's interpretation of the requirements of the Public Records Act (RCW 42.17.250 - .348) seems to be broadening in Progressive Animal Welfare Society (PAWS) v. University of Washington, 125 Wn.2d 243 (1994). However, the Court did not mention performance evaluations in the PAWS decision, while it specifically found "nothing resembling protected 'personal information'" in the PAWS' request, it ruled that the disclosure of employees' social security numbers, residential addresses, or telephone numbers would be invasive.

City of Pullman, Decision 8086 (PECB, 2003)